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Abstract 
Accurate judgments and decisions are crucial for success in 
many areas of human life. The accuracy of a judgment or 
decision depends largely on the cognitive process applied. In 
research on judgment, decision making, and categorization, 
two kinds of cognitive processes have often been contrasted: 
exemplar-based processes, which use similarity to previously 
encountered items to make judgments, decisions, and 
categorizations, and rule-based processes, which use 
abstracted cue knowledge. Although most cognitive models 
of judgment and decision processes assume that people rely 
on both processes, they differ in whether they assume that one 
process is selected or that both processes are blended into a 
single response. The present research takes a functional 
perspective and investigates what kind of interaction between 
the two processes leads to accurate responses. Based on cross-
validated simulations in real-world domains, it shows that 
blending rule- and exemplar-based processes generally leads 
to better judgments than does choosing between them, 
suggesting that the default strategy should be a blend of both 
processes, which is abandoned only when feedback justifies 
it. 
Keywords: accuracy; multiple-cue judgments; decision 
making; categorization; exemplar models; rules; cognitive 
models; mixtures of experts; simulation. 
Introduction 
Judging quantities, making decisions, and categorizing 
items are crucial elements of successful human behavior. A 
vast and diverse literature in cognitive science and judgment 
and decision making has investigated how people achieve 
these tasks (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Kruschke, 2008; Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1993). The many different models and strategies 
proposed can be broadly classified into two categories with 
reference to the cognitive processes they assume: exemplar-
based processes, which use similarity to previously 
encountered items to make judgments, decisions, and 
categorizations, and rule-based processes, which use 
abstracted cue knowledge (Hahn & Chater, 1998). 
Extensive research has compared the proposed models’ 
ability to describe human behavior. Furthermore, the 
performance of judgment and decision making strategies in 
predicting real-world criteria has been thoroughly 
investigated (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 2011; Todd, Gigerenzer, 
& the ABC Research Group, 2012). 
To our knowledge, however, research in cognitive science 
and judgment and decision making has not previously 
investigated what kind of interaction between exemplar- and 
rule-based processes leads to accurate judgments, decisions, 
and categorizations: relying on just one of the two processes 
or using both? If both are considered, is it better to choose 
between them depending on the structure of the task, for 
instance (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), or to blend them into a 
joint response? This paper presents first answers to these 
questions. 
A functional perspective on the interaction between 
exemplar- and rule based processes may be useful for at 
least three reasons. First, examining cognitive models’ 
ability to predict external real-world criteria goes a step 
further than comparing their ability to describe human 
behavior in idealized laboratory tasks, by adding a further 
evaluation criterion. If one class of cognitive models were 
superior to another in terms of predictive performance, this 
would make them more attractive as plausible models of 
human behavior (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). Second, many 
cognitive models are inspired by or share similarities with 
models from research fields interested in predictive 
performance (such as statistics, artificial intelligence, 
computer science, and machine learning; see e.g., Jäkel, 
Schölkopf, & Wichmann, 2009; Marling, Sqalli, Rissland, 
Munoz-Avila, & Aha, 2002), and a functional perspective 
provides a common ground that serves to re-connect 
cognitive models with such fields. Third, knowledge of how 
to profit from the complementary strengths of the two 
processes could offer prescriptions for improving human 
judgment, decision making, and categorization by 
instructing decision makers on when and how to use the two 
processes. 
Models of Judgment, Decision Making, and 
Categorization 
There are two general approaches to modeling human 
cognition. First, single general-purpose models have been 
proposed (e.g., Lee & Cummins, 2004). For instance, 
judgment and categorization models assume either only 
exemplar-based (e.g., Juslin & Persson, 2002; Kruschke, 
1992) or only rule-based processes (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 
1988; Brehmer, 1994). Second, toolbox approaches have 
been proposed. These assume that people draw on multiple, 
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different processes to solve the same task (e.g., Gigerenzer 
& Selten, 2001). The toolbox approach posits that people 
adaptively select a tool (i.e., strategy) likely to succeed in 
the task at hand from a repertoire of strategies: the 
“toolbox” (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Payne et al., 1993; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne, Rieskamp, & 
Wagenmakers, 2013). Toolbox approaches have gained 
popularity particularly in decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer 
& Selten, 2001; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Yet also in 
categorization and judgment research, it is frequently 
assumed that people chose the process that is better suited to 
solving a task (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 
1998; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Nosofsky, Palmeri, 
& McKinley, 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). For 
example, COVIS assumes that similarity-based and rule-
based processes “race” for an answer, with the faster one 
determining the response (Ashby et al., 1998).  
Although toolbox approaches often assume competition 
between processes, it is also possible that the processes 
cooperate. Hybrid or blending models assume that, instead 
of “choosing” a process for a task, two or more processes 
are executed simultaneously and their responses are 
integrated. For instance, the categorization model ATRIUM 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) combines both exemplar- and 
rule-based processes. Inspired by the “mixtures-of-experts” 
approach from machine learning (Jacobs, Jordan, Nowlan, 
& Hinton, 1991), ATRIUM assumes that people have two 
“experts” in their mind: an exemplar-based and a rule-based 
one, whose outputs are processed by a gating mechanism. 
This gating mechanism can “choose” between these 
modules or “blend” their outputs by averaging their 
responses. In addition, ATRIUM can learn to rely more 
strongly on the more successful module (in terms of the 
probability of choosing or weighted averaging)—either for 
the whole task or depending on the item presented (i.e., 
depending on its location in psychological space). Modeling 
and experimental investigations support ATRIUM’s 
assumption that exemplar- and rule-based processes 
simultaneously influence how humans categorize (e.g., 
Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & 
Brumby, 2010). There is also evidence for such 
simultaneous influence in the domain of multiple-cue 
judgments (von Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, in press). 
Blending and Choosing Within One Mind 
The combination of judgments or decisions from different 
sources is a vibrant topic in research fields such as 
psychology, judgment and decision making, cognitive 
science, statistics, artificial intelligence (AI), machine 
learning, biology, and economics (e.g., Krause, Ruxton, & 
Krause, 2010; Kuncheva, 2004; Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 
2012; Lee, Zhang, & Shi, 2011; Marling et al., 2002). 
Combining diverse sources (e.g., forecasts from different 
experts) generally improves accuracy because different 
sources often compensate for each other’s shortcomings. 
Depending on the circumstances, either choosing between 
(“competition”) or blending different sources 
(“cooperation”) may lead to better performance. 
On the one hand, choosing a specific strategy allows the 
overall decision process to be adapted to environmental 
regularities and thus facilitates good performance (e.g., 
Todd et al., 2012). On the other hand, “blending” (i.e., 
averaging) different sources can often improve accuracy 
because errors of different signs cancel each other out. This 
“wisdom of crowds” phenomenon (Surowiecki, 2004) has 
recently also been applied to individual minds (e.g., Herzog 
& Hertwig, 2009, 2013; Vul & Pashler, 2008). Combining 
exemplar- and rule-based processes can be seen as an 
implicit “crowd within,” where the two processes constitute 
two “experts” in one mind that either compete or cooperate 
in giving a response. To the extent that exemplar- and rule-
based processes complement each other in the errors they 
commit, combining them may be a successful strategy 
(Herzog & von Helversen, 2013). 
In the following simulation study, we compare the merits 
of single purpose models, a competitive toolbox approach, 
and a cooperative toolbox approach. We focus on exemplar-
based and rule-based processes as examples of distinctive 
cognitive processes because of the prominent distinction 
between the two in the cognitive literature (Ashby et al., 
1998; Hahn & Chater, 1998; Nosofsky et al., 1994; Persson 
& Rieskamp, 2009). 
Different Levels of Interaction: Task or Item 
Besides differentiating between choosing (competition) and 
blending (cooperation) of cognitive processes, we also 
consider on which level the interaction takes place: the task 
or item level. In the ecological rationality and adaptive 
toolbox approach (Todd et al., 2012), it is (implicitly) 
assumed that the selection of strategies happens on the task 
level—that is, that all the decisions within the same task are 
solved using the same strategy (once learning has 
completed). However, strategy selection (or integration) can 
also happen on the item level—that is, some items may be 
better solved by a rule, whereas others require memorization 
(Nosofsky et al., 1994). To account for this level of 
interaction, we compared competition and cooperation on 
the task and the item level. 
Simulation Study: Should Judgments Be Based 
on Exemplars, Rules or Both? 
We investigated the performance of different ways to use 
exemplar- and rule-based processes in predicting a 
continuous criterion based on multiple cues. To this end, we 
conducted cross-validated simulations, informed by 
ATRIUM’s (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) cognitive 
architecture, in five real-world domains. We addressed the 
following three questions. First, is it better to be equipped 
with both exemplar- and rule-based processes or is one 
process enough to achieve accurate judgments? Second, if 
both processes are used, is it better to choose between them 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the real-world datasets (adapted from Table 1 in Dana & Dawes, 2004). 
N = number of cases, k = number of cues, ρ = correlation between target variable and predicted values from a multiple linear 
regression, v Vector = zero-order correlation between target variable and cues, ∅rxixj = mean correlation among cues. 
 
Dataset N k ρ v Vector ∅rxixj 
Abalone 4,177 7 .73 .63 .58 .56 .56 .54 .50 .42 .89 
NFL 3,057 10 .54 .46 .43 .37 .34 .33 .27 .21 .07 .05 .05 .21 
ABC 955 5 .35 .32 .20 .06 .04 .02 .08 
NES 1,910 6 .35 .26 .17 .15 .15 .13 .12 .11 
WLS 6,385 5 .20 .13 .11 .10 .10 .10 .15 
      
(competition) or to blend them (cooperation)? Third, for 
either choosing between or blending the two processes, is it 
better to treat all items the same (i.e., integration on the task 
level) or to treat individual items differently (i.e., integration 
on the item level)? Item-level integration implies choosing 
between the processes for each item (in the competitive 
approach) or weighting the two processes differently for 
each item when blending (in the cooperative approach). 
Datasets 
We analyzed datasets previously used to compare the 
performance of proper and improper linear models (Dana & 
Dawes, 2004). The datasets pertain to five domains: 
biology, sports, public opinion, political sentiment, and 
occupational prestige. In all datasets, a continuous target 
variable was predicted by several cues. For instance, the 
ABC dataset was derived from a 2002 poll of 955 U.S. 
households. Respondents’ confidence that Osama bin Laden 
would be captured or killed was predicted by five cues, 
including the respondent’s age, education, gender, and 
patriotism. See Table 1 for details of the statistical structure. 
Cognitive Models 
Exemplar Model To represent an exemplar-based judgment 
process, we used an exemplar model for multiple-cue 
judgments (Juslin et al., 2008). The model assumes that 
judgments are based on the similarity to exemplars stored in 
memory, where the judgment is an average of the criterion 
values of the stored exemplars weighted by their similarity 
to the target item. We used a simplified exemplar model 
with one single free parameter determining the similarity 
gradient (see von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). 
 
Rule Model To represent a rule-based process, we used a 
multiple linear regression model. Such models have been 
widely used to model human judgment (Brehmer, 1994); 
they assume that judgments can be understood as the sum of 
weighted cue values. The model has a free parameter for 
every cue plus an intercept. 
Simulation Setup 
For each simulation run, we randomly drew a learning 
sample and a test sample. We then fitted the free parameters 
of the exemplar and the rule model to the learning sample—
minimizing the root mean square error (RMSE) between 
model predictions and criterion values—and used the 
estimated parameter values to make predictions for the 
items in the test sample (for six different strategies 
described below). We measured estimation accuracy in the 
test sample using the RMSE between the model’s 
predictions and the criterion values, a commonly used 
measure of absolute goodness of fit. Seven different sizes of 
learning samples were used (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 200, and 
500 items) to vary the amount of experience with a domain; 
all test samples consisted of 250 items. For each dataset and 
each of the sizes of learning samples, we ran the simulation 
1,000 times and averaged the results.  
Using the Rule and Exemplar Models 
We tested six strategies for using rule- and exemplar-based 
processes to make predictions for the test sample. 
 
“Exemplar Model” and “Rule Model” The first two 
strategies used just one of the two processes exclusively.  
 
“Choosing-Task” and “Choosing-Item” The third and 
fourth strategy chose either the exemplar or the rule model.  
On the task level, “choosing-task” selected in each 
simulation run the model that was superior in the learning 
sample and used it for all items in the test sample. To 
account for differences in model complexity, we used the 
Bayesian Information Criterion as a selection criterion.  
On the item level, “choosing-item” selected in each 
simulation run and for each item in the test sample the 
model that was more likely to be superior for this particular 
test item—based on the performance on similar items in the 
learning sample. Specifically, for each test item we 
calculated the RMSE that the exemplar and the rule model 
had on similar items in the learning sample (i.e., we 
weighted the RMSE values of each training item using the 
similarity gradient of the exemplar model). The process with 
the lower weighted RMSE was then selected and its 
prediction for this test item was used. 
 
“Blending-Average” and “Blending-Item” The fifth and 
sixth strategy blended the outputs of the exemplar and the 
rule model to make a joint prediction.  
On the task level, “blending-average” computed for each 
test item the arithmetic mean of the predictions of the rule 
and the exemplar model. 
On the item level, “blending-item” used in each 
simulation run and for each item in the test sample a
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Figure 1: Cross-validated estimation accuracy (Root Mean Squared Error, RMSE) of six strategies in five domains (for 
learning samples of different sizes). The upper left panel averages the normalized data across domains; the RMSE values 
were divided by the largest average RMSE value in each domain. The strategies are explained in the text. 
 
weighted average of both models’ predictions—using the 
same similarity-weighted RMSEs as in “choosing-item.” 
The item-specific weight for the exemplar model was 
calculated as the proportion of the rule model’s weighted 
RMSE relative to the sum of both models’ weighted RMSEs 
(i.e., the worse the rule model, the larger the weight on the 
exemplar model). 
Results & Discussion 
Figure 1 shows the generalization performance of the 
different strategies as a function of the size of the learning 
sample for the five domains. Because the datasets differed 
in their range of criterion values, which in turn affected the 
scale of the RMSE, it was necessary to normalize the 
RMSEs before aggregating them across datasets. To this 
end, we divided each RMSE by the largest average RMSE 
value within the respective domain, so that each RMSE 
value could be understood as the relative increase in fit. We 
then constructed a summary learning curve by averaging the 
normalized RMSEs across the five domains (see Figure 1, 
upper left panel). 
Four results are noteworthy. First, “blending-average” 
was generally more accurate than either the exemplar or the 
rule model; the exemplar model was somewhat better than 
the averaged predictions of both models only for very small 
learning samples (i.e., 20 items). Second, “blending-
average” was generally more accurate than choosing the 
better model based on its performance in the respective 
learning sample (“choosing-task”), although choosing was 
slightly better for very small learning samples (i.e., 20 
items) in two of the five datasets. Third, when choosing or 
blending, it did not pay off to tune one’s use of the models 
to the type of item. Weighting both processes when 
blending (“blending-item”) was less or equally accurate than 
was giving them equal weights (“blending-average”); 
similarly, choosing the process depending on the item 
(“choosing-item”) was less or equally accurate than was 
using the same process for all items (“choosing-task”). 
Fourth, the differences between strategies decreased as the 
size of the learning samples increased. 
Let us now answer the three questions motivating this 
simulation. First, in the datasets we investigated, it was 
generally better to be equipped with both exemplar- and 
rule-based processes than with just one of the two processes. 
Second, if both processes were used, it was generally better 
to blend them than to choose between them. Third, when 
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choosing between or blending the two processes, it was 
generally better to treat all items the same (and not to 
choose or blend, respectively, depending on the type of 
item; i.e., depending on how much “expertise” the 
exemplar- and rule-based processes had about a specific part 
of the psychological space). 
General Discussion 
Many cognitive models of judgment, decision-making, and 
categorization assume that people can use both exemplar- 
and rule-based processes (e.g., Erickson & Kruschke, 1998). 
Yet it remained unclear whether using both processes 
provides a performance advantage over using just one 
process and, when both processes are available, whether it is 
better to choose one process depending on the task (i.e., 
competitive toolbox approach) or to blend their responses 
(i.e., cooperative toolbox approach). Our simulations in the 
domain of multiple-cue judgments suggest that combining 
the two processes (either by choosing between or blending 
them) leads to better judgments than does relying on just 
one of them, and that a simple blend (i.e., equal weighting) 
of both processes leads to accurate judgments. This latter 
point is consistent with the success of naïve equal weighting 
strategies (e.g., Dawes, 1979). In another set of simulations, 
we investigated the combination (i.e., choosing or blending) 
of exemplar- and rule-based processes in the context of 
making categorizations (using 38 machine learning 
benchmark datasets; Herzog & von Helversen, 2013). 
Further broadening the scope of the present analysis, we 
found that blending the outputs of an exemplar- and a rule-
based process led to successful categorizations. 
Our results resonate with research in AI and machine 
learning that demonstrates how combining different 
representations is often beneficial (Kuncheva, 2004; 
Marling et al., 2002). More specifically, our results 
suggesting that combining exemplar- and rule-based 
processes can often increase accuracy in human cognition 
dovetail nicely with the successful combination of case-
based and rule-based reasoning systems in AI (e.g., Marling 
et al., 2002; Prentzas & Hatzilygeroudis, 2007).  
Besides the general question of whether exemplar- and 
rule-based processes should be “blended” or “chosen” 
among, our simulations suggest that it does not pay off to 
tune one’s use of exemplar- and rule-based processes to the 
type of item one wants to generalize to. This conclusion 
seems inconsistent with empirical studies suggesting that 
participants successfully choose between processes in 
categorization tasks (e.g., Erickson, 2008). Yet these 
experimental tasks may be unrepresentative of real-world 
situations. In many experimental studies—especially in 
categorization research—there is little (or no) doubt about 
which process is better suited to solving the whole task (or 
responding to a specific item), and a participant can thus 
learn to choose between or differentially use the two 
processes. We speculate that deviating from a simple 
blending strategy is generally worthwhile only in domains 
in which one process is clearly superior to the other, both 
processes make similar errors, and this statistical structure 
can be ascertained with enough confidence (see Soll & 
Larrick, 2009). However, we would argue that this is 
typically not the case in real-world domains. It would thus 
seem prudent that human judges and decision makers, as 
modeled, for example, by ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 
1998), start with a simple blend of both processes and 
deviate from this approach (e.g., by choosing or item-
specific tuning) only when feedback justifies it.  
Why is combining exemplar- and rule-based processes so 
successful in multiple-cue judgment tasks? The use and the 
performance of exemplar- and rule-based processes in 
multiple-cue judgment tasks seems to depend on the 
statistical structure of the task—in particular, the functional 
relation between cues and criteria (Juslin et al., 2008; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). If the criterion can be 
approximated by a linear additive combination of the cues, 
rule-based processes predominate. In multiplicative tasks, 
by contrast, exemplar-based processes perform better and 
are used more frequently. Simulations using artificially 
created domains (Herzog & von Helversen, 2013) suggest 
that the five real-world domains we analyzed in the present 
simulations represent a mixture of these two kinds of 
statistical structures (i.e., additive and multiplicative). 
Consequently, neither of the two processes in isolation was 
able to capture their statistical structure. To the extent that 
this result generalizes to decision making and 
categorization, it suggests one reason why people are 
equipped with and use both exemplar- and rule-based 
processes: because only a combination of the two allows 
people to make successful judgments, decisions, and 
categorizations in the real world. 
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